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ABSTRACT
This article investigates the effects of individual directors for corporate 
strategies and firm performance over the course of the 20th century for 
Dutch exchange-listed firms. We apply a multi-method approach on 
directors with many executive and supervisory roles in multiple firms – 
so-called big linkers. We first identify exceptional big linkers, board 
members whose presence is systematically related with firm character-
istics. Our approach allows us to identify a number of exceptional indi-
viduals who were previously overlooked by business historians. Then 
we investigate the backgrounds of these exceptional big linkers. We 
find that their biographies and other archival materials provide expla-
nations for their systematic relation with corporate outcome variables 
such as performance, debt and investments. Using additional informa-
tion about these directors, including network centrality, bank relations 
and family histories, we are able to shed light on the multitude of expla-
nations for the roles of exceptional big linkers.
1. Introduction
Directors of firms play a dominant role in formulating corporate strategy and in determining 
the direction of the firm. During most of the twentieth century, with assigned legal and 
statutory powers, these directors had the responsibility to design and execute the strategies 
of corporations. And because many directors serve on multiple boards, networks or social 
links between board members, both formal and informal, are seen as important for business 
transactions (Streeck, 2001). Business historians have a long tradition in explaining changes 
in networks of directors over longer periods of time (see for a collection of countries David 
& Westerhuis, 2014; and recent studies: Lluch, Rinaldi, Salvaj, & Vasta, 2017; Wilson, Buchnea, 
& Tilba, 2017). The underlying idea of these studies is that networks improve the transfer of 
knowledge and expertise among directors (Carpenter, Li, & Jiang, 2012; Davis, 1991; Westphal, 
1999). However, it remains difficult to assess claims that directors with multiple board 
© 2019 the Author(s). Published by informa uK Limited, trading as taylor & Francis Group
CONTACT Gerarda Westerhuis  g.k.westerhuis@uu.nl
https://doi.org/10.1080/00076791.2019.1676736
this is an open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-nonCommercial-noDerivatives License 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, 
provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way.
KEYWORDS
Business history; corporate 
strategy; big linkers; social 
networks; directovrs
2 A. DE JONG ET AL.
positions have a capacity to shape corporate strategy and performance, or whether their 
presence is even correlated with firm characteristics.
Carpenter et al. (2012, p. 1335) make a distinction between network possessions, which 
reflect the availability of actors’ useful ties, versus network utilisations, which indicate actors’ 
efforts to actually use the ties. Often the focus in network analysis remains on the first, which 
is network possession, because utilisations are difficult to observe. An assumption in social 
network analysis is that the position of an actor in the network reflects his influence or power. 
A central position allows for better access to resources that circulate in the network than a 
more separate position (Shane & Cable, 2002; Uzzi, 1996). Director duties – studied by earlier 
literature – are providing advice (Lorsch & MacIver, 1989; Westphal, 1999), monitoring 
(Bainbridge, 1993; Fama, 1980; Johnson, Daily, & Ellstrand, 1996) and strategizing (Kesner & 
Johnson, 1990; Lorsch & MacIver, 1989). Studies such as Carpenter and Westphal (2001) find 
that directors with multiple appointments can provide relevant strategic knowledge and 
claim that the directors’ social network is an important part in setting corporate strategies.
Our study focuses on network utilisation by investigating the association of big linkers, 
or directors with multiple board positions, with the strategies and performance of Dutch 
firms in the twentieth century, i.e. over the period 1908–2003. Our sample includes 6637 
firm-year observations with 48,524 board seats. From this data we identify 102 individual 
directors as big linkers. The goal of our article is first to identify exceptional big linkers, i.e. 
directors with many board seats and statistically significant correlations with firm charac-
teristics after controlling for firm and board characteristics. Then we investigate the excep-
tional big linkers in-depth in order to understand the reasons for their significance.
In our approach, we build on two well-established streams of research, which have not 
been combined in a single analysis so far. The first stream is fixed effect modelling, as pio-
neered by Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999), who show that inter-industry wage differ-
entials are largely driven by individual workers’ fixed effects. In short, these models run 
regressions with indicator or dummy variables explaining some outcome, where the pres-
ence of individuals over multiple observations allow the estimation of the effect of these 
individuals. The method is by now well established and our estimations follow the approach 
in these studies. Fixed effects models have been used in management studies (Bertrand & 
Schoar, 2003), accounting (Bamber, Jiang, & Wang, 2010; DeJong & Ling, 2013; Ge, Matsumoto, 
& Zhang, 2011; Richardson, Tuna, & Wysocki, 2003) and corporate governance (e.g. Bouwman, 
2011; Cronqvist & Fahlenbrach, 2008; Graham, Li, & Qiu, 2011). The second stream of research 
is the historical prosopography where biographies are made for a larger group of interesting 
individuals based on primary and secondary sources.
We apply a two-step method, i.e. a mixed-method approach (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 
2004; Small, 2011; Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2003). In the first step we run regression models 
with fixed effects for big linkers, in order to estimate the statistical significance of relations 
with firm characteristics for each of our 102 big linkers. We list the board members ranked 
by the strength of their relations with firm characteristics. This ranking features the excep-
tional big linkers. In the second step we use primary and secondary sources that describe 
each of our high-ranked (exceptional) big linkers to provide understanding and context. As 
such in this step we use prosopographical analysis to facilitate a deeper investigation into 
the systematic correlations exhibited by exceptional big linkers.
Our approach facilitates four distinct objectives. First, for each big linker we can estimate 
whether this person’s presence exhibits a systematic relation with the characteristics of the 
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firms he or she is associated with. Second, from the list of big linkers we can provide a ranking 
to identify the exceptional individuals, i.e. those with the strongest relation with a set of firm 
characteristics. Third, using the strongest relation with a specific firm characteristic, we can 
identify additional exceptional individuals. Consequently, our analysis does have the advan-
tage that it can identify exceptional big linkers previously overlooked by business historians. 
Fourth, we can relate our statistical estimations to additional sources, allowing for an in-depth 
explanation of the estimates for exceptional big linkers. We find this latter element to be 
crucial, in order to distinguish whether big linkers represent interests of a business or busi-
ness interests. In particular, ‘biggest’ big linkers are not necessarily exceptional big linkers. 
That is, those big linkers with the most seats are not per se those individuals who significantly 
relate to firm characteristics.
We focus on individual directors, which contrasts with the traditional emphasis on inter-
locking directorates in the business historical and related literatures (David & Westerhuis, 
2014; Lluch et al., 2017; Wilson et al., 2017), where interlocks are typically presented as char-
acteristics of firms, or interlocks are presented as ties in a network of directors. Our approach 
does not apply to firm characteristics determined by the interlock or the present of a big 
linker, but rather to the directors as unique individuals. In our view, the exceptionality of 
some directors is determined by a multitude of ties with firms, and thus correlates with firm 
strategies and performance. This perspective then allows us to discuss that being a big linker 
as such does not yield effects, but being a big linker with particular unique characteristics 
does. Consequently, board interlock studies that exclusively investigate whether directors 
are a big linker and the effects thereof, are incomplete, because the effects are not homo-
geneous, but instead depend on the characteristics of the exceptional big linker.
Although our analysis adds to the understanding of director effects on firms, we are aware 
of the limitations of our mixed-method approach. First, the approach cannot measure match-
ing of big linkers with firms versus influence of big linkers; this distinction has to be found 
in primary and secondary sources. Second, our results only pertain to big linkers (those 
individuals with sufficient number of board positions over firms and in time for each board 
member), as such they cannot be used as general conclusions about the effect of board and 
board member characteristics on firm characteristics.
2. Directors, networks and the effect on corporate strategy
The foundation for the relevance of big linkers through interlocking directorships on cor-
porate strategies is threefold. First, interlocking ties are sources of information, which might 
increase a director’s cognitive horizon (Pennings, 1980). Second, firms depend on their envi-
ronment for access to essential resources, such as funding and investment opportunities. 
To cope with this, interlocking directorships reduce transaction costs and are used as an 
instrument for co-optation (Pfeffer, 1972). Third, because strategic decisions are characterised 
by high uncertainty and risks, directors might rely on accepted rules or norms, an example 
of isomorphic behaviour (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).
Studies into the effect of board members with multiple directorships on corporate per-
formance show mixed evidence (Andres, Bongard, & Lehmann, 2013; Ferris, Jagannathan, 
& Pritchard, 2003; Fich & Shivdasani, 2006; Harris & Shimizu, 2004). Mizruchi (1996) argues 
that the ambiguity may be a reflection of a casual ordering problem. Firm performance is 
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both a result of the actions of previous directors and a factor that in itself potentially influ-
ences the choices of subsequent directors (Hermalin & Weisbach, 2003). In addition to these 
general arguments, researchers have identified purposes of ties that are specific to institu-
tional arrangements; for example, Khanna and Rivkin (2006) present compelling evidence 
that in Chilean business groups boundaries of the group are largely delineated by director 
ties, which are at least as important as equity and family ties. Recent studies have used 
quantitative approaches to deal with this endogeneity (Martin, Gozubuyuk, & Becerra, 2015) 
and have shown a downside of interlocking directorships, i.e that too many board positions 
might lead to inefficiency of directors that become too busy to do their job (Ferris et al., 2003).
Generally it is assumed that firms or directors that are most centrally located in the cor-
porate network have potential to wield power (e.g. Heemskerk & Fennema, 2009; Helmers, 
Mokken, Plijter, & Stokman, 1975). Useem (1979) defines business people with multiple board 
or ownership positions as the inner circle. Because of these multiple positions, he reasons, 
they occupy also board positions at other institutions, including board positions in different 
types of public and non-profit private institutions, such as government agencies, schools, 
and foundations. It is what Useem calls institutional governance. This can largely be seen as 
symbolic but as much it might be an indication of capitalist control of private as well as 
public life (Useem, 1979, p. 554). The inner circle often possess a high degree of cohesion, 
with common interests and common goals. Useem goes on by arguing that members of the 
inner circle, sitting on several boards, have a unique position compared with members of 
the elite who have a board position on just a single firm. They thus have significant connec-
tions with at least several major firms. Significant connections Useem defines as ‘those which 
involve the capacity to shape corporate policy, and include substantial ownership in a firm, 
service as a director or officer, and close kinship with those holding the former connections’. 
In this way ‘interlocking directors are in a position to recognise and help reconcile the prob-
lems of several firms, often operating in very different environments’ (Useem, 1979, 555). 
Haunschild (1993), for example, investigates inter-organisational imitation by analysing the 
relation between interlocks and the acquisition activities of firms. She finds that directors 
transfer information on the efficiency of certain policies by observing the consequences of 
management decisions. Davis (1991) finds that firms were more likely to adopt ‘poison pill’ 
takeover defences when they were centrally located in the network and were interlocked 
with firms that had already adopted that sort of defence.
3. Dutch firms in the twentieth century
We study big linkers in Dutch listed firms during the 20th century. Dutch business can be 
characterised by a long tradition of entrepreneurship, family business and large multina-
tionals. Over the century, periods of stability were followed by disruption. Crises, world wars, 
and globalisation are examples of exogenous factors that challenged Dutch business 
(Sluyterman, 2005). Following the Varieties of Capitalism literature (Hall & Soskice, 2003), 
one could say that the Netherlands swung from a liberal market economy in the beginning 
of the twentieth century, towards a coordinated market economy after the Second World 
War, and reverted back again to a more liberal one from the 1980s (De Jong, Röell, & 
Westerhuis, 2014; for more details on Dutch capitalism see Sluyterman, 2014).
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The Dutch corporate network emerged at the end of the 19th century when industrialisation 
began to take hold and the economy grew rapidly. Firms were created and many of them 
were listed on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange. A temporarily decline of the network in the 
1930s was followed by a period of consolidation in the 1950s–1970s. Since the 1980s the 
network gradually declined, and more significantly at the turn of the century, when the 
number of board positions held by directors declined substantially (Westerhuis, 2014). This 
general trend from emergence, to consolidation, and then to decline of the network is very 
similar to other national networks, such as in the US, Germany, and Switzerland although 
the pace of the decline and the explaining factors differed across countries (David & 
Westerhuis, 2014).
In the 20th century, both in the liberal and coordinated market economy regimes, direc-
tors of companies have been powerful, compared to shareholders, banks, workers, and other 
stakeholders. In the earlier years the directors were appointed by financiers and in particular 
representing the interests of shareholders and banks (De Jong et al., 2014). Eventhough the 
official appointments were made at the shareholders’ meetings, banks were requiring board 
representation when providing significant loans to firms (Colvin, De Jong, & Fliers, 2015). 
From the 1950s onwards, the direct influence of shareholders over board appointments 
gradually reduced. In the so-called structured regime – legally obliged for firms with over 
100 workers – the right to appoint executive directors was given to a supervisory board 
member, while they were appointing new members via co-optation. Since the 1990s and in 
particular in the early 21th century the relative power of shareholders in board appointments 
has increased with the adoption of Anglo-Saxon ideas about shareholder governance 
(Westerhuis, 2014; Westerhuis & De Jong, 2015). Unfortunately ownership data is only avail-
able for The Netherlands from 1992 and the average share ownership of board members is 
relatively low (4.9% on average per firms for the management board and 1.8% for the super-
visory board; see De Jong, Kabir, Marra, & Röell, 2001).
4. Mixed-method approach
We apply a mixed-method research design in which we combine quantitative with qualitative 
research, as we complement statistical modelling with analysis of biographical descriptions 
from secondary sources. Using these approaches we are able to provide a historical context 
to the empirical findings, taking advantage of the strengths and mitigating the weaknesses 
of either methodology (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2010). The strength of the statistical method 
is that magnitudes of the correlations of individual big linkers with firm characteristics can 
be estimated, while the weakness is that the effects are merely correlations and no inferences 
about causality are possible. However, because of the historical method we can infer some 
degree of causality from detailed historical context and rich descriptions (Morck & 
yeung, 2011).
In the quantitative part of the mixed method we identify big linkers in our sample by 
using data on board members of Dutch exchange-listed corporations over the period 
1903–2003, with 5-year intervals. In the literature it is common to define big linkers as 
directors that have three or more board positions (David & Westerhuis, 2014) and we follow 
this convention. Given our objective to assess whether big linkers have a systematic con-
tribution to corporate strategies and performance we define a big linker as that board 
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member who at any point in time has at least three board positions (i.e. three seats at the 
same time) and over the course of his entire career has a minimum of 10 board seats (i.e. 
10 seats from the first till the last time he is observed in our data). The first component 
requires at least three seats in a single year, which ensures that we identify a linker. The 
second component of 10 sets over the career ensures that we do not select a linker with 
little potential to influence firms and also guarantees the validity of the inclusion of big 
linker fixed effects in our models.1
We match our big linkers to a dataset containing financial statements and governance 
information and estimate linear regressions with multiple variables to examine the impact 
of big linker presence in a board on corporate outcomes. We investigate 12 outcome vari-
ables, which proxy corporate strategy and performance. As performance metrics we use 
return on equity, return on assets, dividends, and the market-to-book value. These four 
measures span a wide array of performance measures based on accounting conventions, 
cash payouts to shareholders and stock market valuation. For financing choice we use lever-
age, the interest coverage ratio, liquid assets, net working capital, and the current ratio. These 
ratios cover both the choices in long term financing between debt and equity, as well as 
short term considerations such a liquidity and working capital. Finally, we measure invest-
ments in fixed assets, firm growth, and tangibility of assets as proxies of the real sphere for 
investment and asset structure.
Models (1) through (3) highlight our regression equations, where Outcomei,t are firm- 
specific outcome variables, Fi,t is a set of variables containing explanatory firm characteristics,2 
ωt is a set dummy variables for each year to capture unobserved macroeconomic shocks, θi,t 
is a set of dummy variable for each industry present in our data, this in order to capture 
unobserved industry-specific variation. We subsequently add a set of variables Bi,t capturing 
firm-specific board characteristics (board size, total number of firm interlocks, total number 
of bank interlocks). To allow for time variation in the firm and industry determinants we 
interact these vectors with τt which is a vector of five period effects, in order to correct for 
temporal shifts in corporate characteristics and hence our data composition.3 Finally in Model 
(3) we add vector  Mi,t  capturing 102 big linker fixed effects.4
Outcomei,t = α + β1Fi,tτt + β2ωt + β3θi,tτt + εi,t (1)
Outcomei,t = α+ β1Fi,tτt + β2ωt + β3θi,tτt + β4Bi,tτt + εi,t (2)
Outcomei,t = α + β1Fi,tτt + β2ωt + β3θi,tτt + β4Bi,tτt + β5Mi,t + εi,t (3)
We use base-line OLS regressions for 12 firm outcome variable and for 19 benchmark years. 
Our modelling involves a large number of explanatory variables, which serve in our view 
the purpose of carefully controlling for firm and board characteristics, when estimating 
the big linker fixed effects. Using this conservative approach we prevent finding fixed 
effects that are the result of omitted variables (see Green (1991) for rules on the minimum 
number of observations per regressor and Bertrand and Schoar (2003), DeJong and Ling 
(2013) for similar fixed effects studies).5 Because we run the risk of overfitting the data, we 
conduct robustness analysis using ‘leave-one-out cross-validation’ (LOOCV, see Geisser, 
1975) and ‘least absolute shrinkage and selection operator’ (LASSO, see Tibshirani, 1996) 
estimations.6
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We calculate the coefficient of determination (R2) per cross section, which measures the 
explained variance relative to total variance. The larger the increase of the R2 in a cross section 
when big linker fixed effects are added, the larger the importance of these fixed effects. 
Although we estimate our model as a single panel, we calculate the R2 for each of the twenty 
cross sections. This is particularly relevant, because it allows us to show the importance of 
big linkers over the century.
Using Model (3) we obtain regression coefficients and standard errors for each of the 12 
outcome variables for each big linker, after controlling for characteristics of the firm and the 
board. In other words, we estimate for each big linker and each outcome variable what the 
individual board member’s presence adds and we can assess the statistical significance of 
the value-added. We use the ratio of the coefficient and standard error to obtain our measure 
for the effect of the big linker, because this measure – the t-value – incorporates the mag-
nitude of the effect, controlling for the error in the estimate. We rank individual directors 
using the t-statistics pertaining to the individual big linker coefficients.
The rankings of big linkers by t-values allows us to distinguish the exceptional big linkers 
with significant estimates from the complete set of big linkers. Of course, this statistical 
approach allows us to identify exceptional people in a large set of board members, but it 
cannot inform us about the reasons for their exceptionality, and therefore we combine the 
statistical approach with a prosopography.
In the qualitative part of the mixed-method approach we use a prosopographical 
approach providing biographical descriptions to better understand who the big linkers are 
that contribute to firm performance and strategies. For the 10 big linkers who had the highest 
contribution we focus on individual characteristics of the big linkers and on features of the 
network in which they operate. We do this in the following way. We analyse the position in 
the network in which a big linker operates by looking at the number of board positions and 
his centrality in the corporate network. Additionally we see whether they have positions in 
cultural, educational, and political institutions, such as foundations, schools and universities, 
and government agencies. Big linkers that have many board positions and/or are more 
centrally located in the networks can use their position to wield power because the exposure 
and access to social capital – the resources gained through membership in the networks – is 
higher (‘institutional governance’, according to Useem, 1979). Thus directors might reap 
social capital benefits from these networks and so increase their influence in corporate 
performance, in their access to resources and/or in lowering transactions costs. A dense 
network would imply that big linkers can take better advantage of social capital hidden in 
the network.
However, directors do not become influential only because of their place in the network. 
Other features of the big linkers might be important as well. Thus we investigate whether 
big linkers from elite families are better able to reap social capital benefits by inherited capital 
and whether big linkers with a university degree are better able to reap social capital benefits 
through educational capital accumulation (Bertrand & Schoar, 2003). We also describe big 
linkers that are as prominent business owners able to reap social capital benefits (Windolf, 
1998). Also, big linkers with positions in banks may have the ability to increase the access 
to financing and reduce transaction costs. According to the literature there are three main 
reasons why bankers would sit on corporate boards. First, interlocking boards of directors 
can increase access to capital for firms and reduce monitoring costs for banks (Lamoreaux, 
1991; Musacchio & Read, 2007; Rajan & Zingales, 2003). Second, bankers on corporate board 
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might function as a legitimising mechanism. Bankers on board give a kind of guarantee to 
investors that the firm will pay dividends on time. This was for example common in the 
Netherlands in the early 20th century when bankers sitting on a corporate board were rep-
resenting the holders of preferred shares of that specific firm (Westerhuis & De Jong, 2015). 
It might also be an indication to other lenders that a firm is creditworthy. Finally, firms might 
want to have bankers on their boards because of their financial expertise and network. 
However, this also gives reason why bankers on the board might not be so beneficial, because 
they might have other interests than the corporate owners.
5. Data
We investigate the effect of big linkers on a sample of Dutch non-financial corporations that 
are listed on the stock exchange of Amsterdam. Our data covers the period 1908–2003. 
Dutch firms have a two-tier system, consisting of a management or executive board and a 
supervisory board. For the set of non-financial firms we collect the names of the directors 
of both boards between 1908 and 2003 with 5-year intervals, but excluding 1943 (we omit 
1943, because of the Second World War; the data is incomplete and the strategy and per-
formance variables are highly influenced by the war). And we do the same for the largest 
financial firms, both listed and non-listed. In the period 1903–1958 we use the 50 largest 
banks based on equity and from 1958 to 1968 based on total assets, while from 1973 onwards 
we select the banks that jointly have a 95% market share based on total assets. By then the 
number of banks is less than fifty due to concentration in the Dutch financial sector from 
the 1960s onwards. For the period 1978–2003 we also include insurance companies that 
jointly have an 80% market share based on gross premiums. We collect board information 
from various sources. From 1903 until 1978 Van Oss Effectenboek provides board information, 
and after 1978 we collect individual board information from annual reports. Next we included 
listed and non-listed banks. We used Financieel Adresboek (1908–1958), annual reports 
(1963 and 1969), FD Omzetcijfers (1978–1993), and FD Compendium Nederlands Bedrijfsleven 
(1998–2003).
Next, we have collected annual report information of all Dutch listed non-financial firms 
between 1903 and 2003 with 5-year intervals. We exclude the financial firms due to differ-
ences in accounting principles. With this dataset we calculate firm size, performance (return 
on assets, return on equity, and market-to-book value) and nine firm strategies. The data 
comes from different sources. First, the Gids bij de Prijscourant contains share and dividend 
information of all securities listed in Amsterdam. Second, the Van Oss Effectenboek is a 
contemporary investor manual. The manual was published annually from 1903 until 1978 
and includes balance sheets, profit and loss statements, share information, and information 
on the distribution of profits (see Colvin et al. (2015) and Westerhuis and De Jong (2015) for 
descriptions of the adjustments to the accounting data). Third, the Tabel – Der laagste en 
hoogste koersen provides information on stock prices and dividends. Fourth, for the period 
from 1977 to 2003 firm data is collected from a database with exchange-listed firms of the 
Centraal Bureau Statistiek (Statistiek Beurs NV’s). We include firms in our sample when in a 
given year complete information is available for the variables in our analyses.7 This limits our 
sample, as in the early part of the twentieth century firms disclosed their financial data on 
a voluntary basis and some firms provided only a limited number of items.
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Subsequently for the big linkers that we identify we collect qualitative information on 
their individual background. Our sources pertain to (however, not exclusively) personal 
archives, obituaries, genealogy reports, The Dutch National Archives, Biografisch 
Woordenboek van Nederland (BWN) 1880–2000, International Institute of Social History, 
Rijksbureau voor Kunsthistorische Documentatie (RKD), Persoonlijkheden in het Koninkrijk 
der Nederlanden, Atlas van de Macht  1998, and Delpher, a resource with digitalised texts 
from newspapers, journals and books from the 15th to the 21st century.
Based on the data sets described above we created three samples. One sample with all 
Dutch listed non-financial firms for which we have complete annual report data between 
1908 and 2003 with 5-year intervals (of 3583 firm-year observations). A second sample with 
all Dutch listed non-financial and the largest financial firms for which we have complete 
board data between 1908 and 2003 with 5-year intervals, excluding 1943 (6637 firm-year 
observations with 48,524 board seats). And, a third sample consists of big linkers including 
personal background information such as age, belonging to elite families, education, bank 
involvement, and network statistics.
We identify 102 big linkers in the twentieth century of which the 10 big linkers with the 
largest number of positions are shown in Table 1. K.P. van der Mandele is the big linker with 
the largest number of positions. He is first observed in a board in 1928 and last in 1963, 
which implies that he occurs in seven cross-sections (1928, 1933, 1938, 1948, 1953, 1958, 
and 1963) with 129 positions (18.4 positions on average per year). Because many positions 
are in banks and some for firms for which we have no complete financial information, we 
have 22 observations for Van der Mandele in non-financial firms with complete data. Figure 1 
shows the development of the number of positions over time.
As can be seen in Figure 1, the number of board seats taken by big linkers has followed 
a similar pattern as the overall corporate network: increase (until 1928), temporarily decline 
(in the 1930s), consolidation (1950s–1960s), and decline (since 1970s). The diminishing num-
ber of firms in our sample accounts for the difference in development between the number 
of big linkers (declining already since the 1970s) and number of big linkers per firm (declining 
only since the late 1990s). The relative late decline of big linkers per firm is consistent with 
Table 1. Big linkers with largest number of board positions.
name First Last Positions
Positions 
(sample)
K.P. van der Mandele 1928 1963 129 22
F.r. Hazelhof 1973 1998 85 14
H. Cremer 1918 1948 78 23
C.J.K. van Aalst 1908 1938 75 27
F.H. Fentener van 
Vlissingen jr.
1968 2003 71 18
H. de ruiter 1988 2003 71 13
s.P. van eeghen 1908 1933 68 17
W.A. van den Wall Bake 1953 1973 67 23
H.F. van Leeuwen 1938 1968 62 35
J.P. van tienhoven 1923 1948 60 17
note: the column first shows the first year a big linker appears in our data. the 
column last shows the last year a big linker appears in our data. the column 
positions shows the total number of positions at firms where the individual 
had a supervisory or management position. the column positions (sample) 
provides the total number of board positions for big linkers with firms in our 
sample.
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics of the big linkers.
Mean Median
Positions total number of board positions 38.69 36.00
Positions (sample) total number of board positions (in sample firms) 16.14 14.00
Banker Dummy variable is equal to 1 if an individual has held a board 
position at a bank
0.78 1.00
Bank number of bank seats to total seats is the proportion of seats  
held at a bank divided by the total number of seats held by  
that individual
0.11 0.10
BankMgt number of bank management seats to total seats is the proportion 
of management positions (rather than supervisory positions) 
held at a bank divided by the total number of seats held by  
that individual
0.03 0.00
Mgt number of management seats to total seats is the proportion of 
management positions (rather than supervisory positions) held 
divided by the total number of seats held by that individual.
0.13 0.12
indies number of positions in the Dutch indies is the number of board 
positions held by an individual at firms that have their base of 
operations (i.e. not their headquarters) in the Dutch colonies
1.16 0.00
elite Dummy variable is equal to 1 if an individual comes from noble 
descent or belongs to a patrician family
0.22 0.00
university Dummy variable is equal to 1 if an individual studied at a  
university in the netherlands or abroad and obtained a degree
0.46 0.00
Politician Dummy variable is equal to 1 if an individual appears to be 
politically active
0.16 0.00
Lawyer Dummy variable is equal to 1 if from individual records become 
apparent they have a law degree
0.07 0.00
Centrality number of connections in the corporate network 45.20 43.50
note: total number of board positions is the number of positions held by a big linker in our database of 6637 firm-year 
observations with 48,524 board seats. total number of board positions (at sample firms) is the number of positions held 
by a big linker in the period 1908–2003, with 5-year intervals, spanning 3583 firm-year observations. An individual is 
part of an elite family when their family is included in the Adelsboek or Patriciaat books. Where people referenced in the 
Adelsboek are of noble descent and people referenced in Patriciaat are part of influential families through their 
contributions to society. Politically active is equal to 1 if an individual appears to be politically active as referenced on 
www.parlement.com (index of all people politically active in the netherlands). network centrality is defined as the 
average degree of an individual, i.e. the number of nodes (other people) they are connected to (i.e. the sum of edges).
Figure 1. number of big linkers over the period 1908–2003.
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the literature, in which it is shown that the Dutch corporate network only declined signifi-
cantly at the turn of the century (Westerhuis, 2014).
In Table 2 descriptive statistics of the 102 big linkers are provided.
On average the 102 big linkers have 39 board positions. Of our big linkers 78% have served 
on a board of a bank. On average 11% of the board seats are with a bank and only 3% are 
management seats with a bank. We find that 13% of all big linker board positions are in the 
management board. The above statistics demonstrate that most of the board positions of 
the big linkers are supervisory board seats with non-financial firms. Of the 102 big linkers, 
Table 3. Firm descriptive statistics per period.
1908–1923 
(N = 600)
1928–1938 
(N = 763)
1948–1963 
(N = 1073)
1968–1983 
(N = 666)
1988–2003 
(N = 481)
Big linker Dummy equal to 1 if and only if 
the firm has a board member 
who has 3 or more board 
positions in any given year 
and 10 or more positions in 
his entire career, and 0 
otherwise
0.162 0.279 0.232 0.282 0.254
Dividend total dividends paid to net 
income
0.453 0.322 0.489 0.403 0.354
Liquid Current assets minus inventory 
to total assets
0.203 0.229 0.334 0.360 0.377
Leverage Debt to total assets 0.375 0.318 0.406 0.522 0.544
investment Percentage change in fixed 
assets (5 year)
2.114 1.615 3.803 1.162 0.875
Growth Percentage change in assets (5 
year)
0.055 −0.005 0.141 0.136 0.127
roe net income to total equity 0.059 0.043 0.096 0.069 0.121
roA Gross income to total assets 0.060 0.055 0.094 0.079 0.069
Market-to-book Market value of equity to 
nominal equity value
1.097 1.043 1.883 1.242 2.368
retained profits equity reserves and retained 
earnings to total assets
0.035 0.029 0.255 0.537 0.260
iCr interest coverage ratio, gross 
profits to interest paid
7.288 7.662 8.431 5.164 7.870
size total assets in millions and 
inflation corrected (base year 
2003, in guilders)
108.73 114.76 161.50 697.35 2293.07
tangibility Fixed assets to total assets 0.422 0.371 0.254 0.333 0.334
nWC Current assets minus short-term 
debt to total assets
0.151 0.222 0.266 0.208 0.155
Qr Current assets minus inventory 
to short-term debt
1.919 2.109 1.481 1.027 0.965
Cr Current assets to short-term debt 2.791 3.205 2.334 1.684 1.447
Board number of board members 7.027 6.664 6.886 8.045 8.054
interlocks total number of interlocking 
directorates
11.177 10.180 9.724 8.592 6.457
interlocks-firm total number of interlocking 
directorates with non-
financial firms
9.433 8.818 8.693 6.845 4.917
interlocks-bank total number of interlocking 
directorates with financial 
firms
1.708 1.419 1.051 1.736 1.509
interlocks-indies total interlocks with firms based 
in the former Dutch indies
2.810 2.478 1.507 0.261 0.012
Conservatism Dummy equals 1 if and only if 
the firm rapidly writes down 
its asset to a value below 10 
guilders, and 0 otherwise
0.278 0.427 0.406 0.227 0.000
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22% belong to an elite family, 16% is or has been political active and 46% has a univer-
sity degree.
Table 3 shows descriptive statistics averages for five different periods consisting of 3583 
firm-year observations. The table shows that the percentage firms with a big linker on board 
is 16% in the first period (1908–1923) and fluctuates between 23% and 28% during the rest 
of the century. Board size increases from around 7 until 1963 to around 8 in the last two 
periods, whereas the total board interlocks decreases from 11.1 in the period 1903–1923 to 
6.5 in the period 1988–2003. The average firm size, measured by total assets, increases a 
little until 1938, and considerably as of the 1960s, which is consistent with the extant liter-
ature (see e.g. Westerhuis & De Jong, 2015).
Next, in order to understand whether big linkers are prevalent in specific firms, we esti-
mate what type of firms – characterised by size, dividends, current ratio, leverage tangibility, 
performance, and board size – are more likely to have a big linker on board. Table 4 shows 
that over the 20th century larger firms and firms with larger boards are more likely to have 
a big linker on their boards. The board size effect weakens over the course of the century. 
For the other variables we do not find strong results and the explanatory power of the models 
is limited. This result is comforting, because there does not seem to be a systematic allocation 
of big linkers in our sample of firms, except for a firm size effect. Therefore, in our big linker 
effect estimations we control for firm and board size.
6. Big linker effects
The purpose of our statistical analysis is to estimate big linker effects, to investigate how 
much of the variability in a firm’s strategy and performance is explained by these director 
fixed effects after controlling for other variables, and to identify exceptional big linkers. 
First we report our estimations for Model (2) and present the results in Panel A of Table 5. 
For example, the presence of our 102 big linkers in a board has a positive effect of 1.6% on 
return on equity in the 1948–1963 period, which is significantly different from zero at the 
5% level. We find that the presence of a big linker (i.e. the general effect of a big linker, 
irrespective of the individual) has only limited effects, which are very specific to different 
outcome variables and varies over time. However, given the limited economic magnitude 
and significance of these effects, we highlight the importance of the contribution that 
specific individuals have.
We subsequently include 102 dummy variables for the presence of each individual big 
linker. We do not allow the director fixed effects to vary over time, because the length of the 
presence of a director in the sample is limited, such that director fixed effects are estimated 
over the maximum number of cross-sections. The results of the estimations are a set of 
regression coefficients and t-values measuring the correlations between outcome variables 
and director presence, controlling for firm, board, industry, and year characteristics. In order 
to explain our approach, an example of a big linker fixed estimation is shown in Panel B of 
Table 5. In this example we explain leverage (as one of the outcome variables) and include 
firm characteristics (firm size, return on assets, dividends, liquid assets), board characteristics 
(board size, total bank interlocks, total firm interlocks), seven industries, all interacted with 
five period dummies, and 19 year and 102 big linker fixed effects. We thus have 191 coeffi-
cients and standard errors, of which we show a set of 15 in Panel B of Table 5. In each of the 
five periods firm size has a positive effect on leverage, which is always significant at the 1% 
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Table 5. Big linker effects. 
Panel A: overall effect of the presence of a big linker on the board.
Period
return on 
equity
return on 
assets Dividends Leverage interest coverage investment
1913–1923 0.011 0.002 0.038 −0.032 −0.087 −2.152*
(0.863) (0.223) (0.747) (−1.358) (−0.222) (−1.781)
1928–1942 0.007 0.007 0.000 0.022 −0.177 0.458
(0.976) (1.302) (0.003) (1.037) (−0.575) (0.660)
1948–1963 0.016** 0.012* 0.002 0.030* 0.118 −0.358
(2.253) (1.911) (0.057) (1.655) (0.589) (−0.322)
1968–1983 −0.006 0.003 0.052** 0.030* −0.436 −0.165
(−0.569) (0.336) (2.301) (1.914) (−1.182) (−0.993)
1988–2003 0.016 0.003 0.022 −0.010 0.332 −0.015
(0.797) (0.448) (0.874) (−0.541) (1.006) (−0.084)
Period Growth Liquid  
assets
Working 
capital
Current  
ratio
tangibility Market-to-book
1913–1923 0.197*** −0.019 0.029 0.152 −0.008 0.071
(3.286) (−0.743) (0.924) (0.431) (−0.190) (0.789)
1928–1942 0.012 0.001 −0.023 −0.216 0.053* −0.054
(0.495) (0.041) (−1.035) (−0.892) (1.759) (−0.604)
1948–1963 −0.000 0.007 0.018 0.139 −0.005 0.216*
(−0.006) (0.477) (1.084) (1.218) (−0.245) (1.803)
1968–1983 −0.236*** −0.002 −0.006 −0.005 0.025 0.075
(−3.290) (−0.169) (−0.481) (−0.117) (1.384) (0.615)
1988–2003 0.022 −0.024 −0.014 −0.035 0.009 0.681***
(0.153) (−0.941) (−0.831) (−0.754) (0.355) (2.615)
note: Coefficients and t-statistics are obtained by estimation of Model 2. For brevity, only the effects for the big linker 
variable are depicted. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Panel B: example of a big linker fixed effect regression.
Variable
size (firm size)
1908–1923 0.071*** (5.818)
1928-1938 0.027*** (2.690)
1948-1963 0.060*** (6.617)
1968-1983 0.038*** (4.498)
1988-2003 0.028*** (3.384)
Board characteristics
Board (Board size)
1908-1923 0.047 (1.202)
1928-1938 −0.023 (−0.593)
1948-1963 −0.037 (−1.135)
1968-1983 −0.042 (−1.276)
1988-2003 −0.059 (−1.387)
Big linker fixed effect
K.P. van der Mandele 0.059 (1.431)
F.r. Hazelhof −0.111*** (−2.875)
H. Cremer 0.030 (0.381)
C.J.K. van Aalst 0.027 (0.432)
F.H. Fentener van Vlissingen jr. −0.130*** (−2.333)
year Fe yes
industry Fe yes
R2 0.372
observations 3583
note: regression coefficients and t-values of an estimation where the explained outcome variable is leverage. For 
brevity, not all variables and interaction effects are depicted. the fixed effects regressions are standard oLs 
estimations including year and industry fixed effects. Additionally we include 102 big linker fixed effects, for brevity, 
we only show the effects of the top five big linkers from table 1. standard errors are clustered at the firm level and 
variables are as defined in table 3. All control variables are interacted with five period dummy variables in order to 
account for changes in firm characteristics over time. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively.
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level. The effect of board size is less clear cut, because the effects sizes are smaller and never 
statistically significant. Most interesting are the estimates for the big linkers. K.P. van der 
Mandele has a point estimate of 0.059 with a t-value of 1.4. In other words, the presence of 
Van der Mandele has a positive association with leverage, which is not statistically significant. 
However, F.R. Hazelhof has a distinct negative effect, with a t-value of −2.9: this big linker is 
found to have a relatively strong association with corporate leverage. That is, firms where 
F.R. Hazelhof is a board member are likely to have between 11.1% less leverage compared 
to firms where he is not a board member.
We calculate the coefficient of determination (R2) per cross section for Models (1)–(3). This 
coefficient measures the explained variance relative to the total variance. The larger the 
increase of the  R2 in a cross section when big linker fixed effects are added, the larger the 
importance of these characteristics. The results are in Table 5 Panel C and in Figure 2.8
Overall the figure shows that board characteristics do not improve the model substantially, 
whereas the big linkers fixed effects do improve the model fit. The average percentage of 
additional explained variance (the dotted line in Figure 2) fluctuates around 1–6% and is 
lower at the beginning and in the end of the twentieth century whereas in 1928 and in the 
1980s it reaches a peak. In particular the relatively high explanatory power in the 1980s is 
interesting, because by then big linkers occupied far less positions (see Figure 2). In Panel C 
of Table 5 we test the significance of the big linker effect in two ways. First, the adjusted 
R-squared for our estimations – a measure that accounts for the complexity of our model – 
does not significantly differ from the standard R-squared reported despite to additional 102 
regressors. Across all our models there is a limited difference between the adjusted and 
regular R-squares. Additionally, we test for each of the estimations whether the big linker 
fixed effects are jointly significant. This test follows an F-distribution with values between 
3.4 and 9.1, which is highly statistically significant (always at 1% level). Because we find that 
big linker fixed effect does improve the model that explains variances in corporate strategies 
and performance, we zoom in into the big linker’s fixed effects.
Panel C: Joint significance of big linker fixed effects per outcome variable.
Model
return  
on equity
return  
on assets Payout Leverage
interest 
coverage investment
F-value (3) 3.42*** 4.98*** 6.80*** 5.22*** 4.14*** 9.12***
r2 (2) 25% 22% 29% 34% 37% 9%
Adjusted r2 (2) 23% 20% 27% 32% 35% 6%
r2 (3) 27% 25% 32% 37% 39% 11%
Adjusted r2 (3) 23% 21% 28% 34% 35% 4%
Δr2 2% 3% 3% 3% 2% 2%
ΔAdjusted r2 0% 1% 1% 1% 0% −2%
Model Growth Liquid assets Working 
capital (net)
Current ratio tangibility Market to 
book
F-value (3) 3.58*** 5.04*** 4.15*** 2.85*** 8.87*** 4.05***
r2 (2) 38% 28% 26% 33% 28% 45%
Adjusted r2 (2) 36% 26% 24% 32% 26% 44%
r2 (3) 41% 30% 29% 36% 31% 48%
Adjusted r2 (3) 36% 27% 25% 32% 27% 45%
Δr2 2% 3% 3% 2% 3% 3%
ΔAdjusted r2 0% 1% 1% 0% 1% 1%
note: the panel shows the F-values for a joint test of significance of the big linker fixed effects from Model 3. We include 
the r-squared and adjusted r-squared for all outcome variables, for models (2) and (3). ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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7. Exceptional big linkers
In the previous section we have established that the fixed effects jointly explain part of the 
variation in the firm characteristics. However, our estimations are correlations, which means 
that the effects can be driven by selection and matching of the big linker qualities with the 
firm’s needs, as well as by the influence of big linkers. To better understand big linker effects 
we investigate our big linkers based on the strength of the effects, because we consider the 
big linkers with the strongest effects to be interesting individuals for further exploration. 
Moreover, we can now identify exceptional big linkers as the board members with systematic 
correlations with firm decisions and performance. Hopefully, our approach identifies inter-
esting big linkers that have been previously overlooked by business historians.
7.1. Are the biggest linkers also exceptional board members?
We first investigate whether the board members with the largest number of positions also 
have the strongest associations. Table 6 shows two important groups of big linkers: first, in 
Panel A, the big linkers with the most board positions (the same individuals as in Table 1) 
and second, in Panel B, the directors with the largest fixed effects from our regressions. The 
effects are measured as the average of the absolute value of the t-statistics.
We find that the big linkers with the most board positions are highly educated (seven 
have university degrees) and obviously centrally located in the Dutch corporate network. 
We find, however, that those individuals with the most board positions do not necessarily 
have substantial associations with corporate strategies. We find only two directors with 
average absolute t-values of at least 1.4 – F.H. Fentener van Vlissingen jr. (1.59) and J.P. van 
Figure 2. the effect of big linkers. note: the annual percentage of the median explained variance over 
the 12 outcome variables for three models and the added explained variance of big linker fixed effects.
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Tienhoven (1.50). The general finding that the biggest big linker exhibits little systematic 
effects is consistent with the literature on busy directors, which highlights that the directors 
with the most commitments are not per se the ones that have the highest contribution to 
corporate strategies and performance (Ferris et al., 2003). The finding is in contrast to the 
literature that assumes that the most central directors also have the most power to influence 
corporate strategies (e.g. Useem, 1979).
7.2. Who are the exceptional big linkers?
Our next question concerns the identity of the board members with the largest effects, which 
we identify as exceptional big linkers. Panel B of Table 6 shows that several directors did 
exhibit strong effects for the 12 variables in our tests. Our first important finding arises thus 
when we compare Panel A and Panel B. The most central directors are not the most important 
ones. This finding also underlines the relevance of our study: apparently directors who are 
big linkers but not the most visible individuals are found to be very interesting to be studied 
in depth.
Half of the most exceptional big linkers were active before Second World War: Van 
Hoboken van Cortgene (1908–1918), Taudin Chabot (1933–1953), Koning (1918–1963), 
Van Delden (1908–1918), and Van Tienhoven (1923–1948). The other half of the big linkers 
were mostly active after Second World War: Martin (1973–1993), Wakkie (1973–1983), Van 
Beek (1953–1983), Fentener van Vlissingen jr. (1968–2003), and Tieleman (1948–1968) of 
whom only Fentener van Vlissingen jr. was active in the more recent period. Their total 
number of board positions range from 15 to 71, which is substantially lower than the 
number of positions the biggest linker in our sample has. Two of the persons are from elite 
families: Fentener van Vlissingen and Van Beek. Four of them have graduated from a uni-
versity, of whom only one person in the early twentieth century. Centrality in the network 
ranges from 14 to 56, but it is hard to make any generalisations here. Four of the 10 persons 
have a management position at a bank; two before and two after the Second World War. 
Hoboken van Cortgene, who contributes most, has only supervisory board positions and 
no management positions at all. The same goes for Van Delden. This is in contrast to the 
notion that executive directors have greater possibilities to exert influence in their man-
agement positions than in supervisory board positions. Interestingly in the period before 
the war, four of five exceptional big linkers have corporate relations with the former colony 
of the Dutch Indies.
Although the above description is interesting, no clear pattern emerges from this set of 
10 most influential big linkers. This implies we need to further study effects of individuals. 
In Table 7 we present the big linkers with largest effects on five different metrics separately: 
return on assets, market value, dividends, investments, and leverage. For each metric we 
present the five directors with the largest positive and the five with the largest negative effect.
In the remainder of this section we aim to understand the big linkers that have an effect 
on strategies and performance and zoom in on individual directors by analysing their effects 
vis-à-vis the biographical backgrounds.
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7.3. Two exceptional individuals: Fentener van Vlissingen and Van Tienhoven
Fentener van Vlissingen junior (active between 1968 and 2003) and Van Tienhoven (active 
between 1923 and 1948) appear in both panels. Compared to the other eight persons, they 
have both a high centrality rate of 48.4 and 56.2, respectively, and the highest number of 
board positions of 71 and 60, respectively. Both have a university degree. The two big linkers 
are active in different time periods, which highlights that, although the majority of big linkers 
are concentrated in the era prior to the Second World War, our analysis does not constrain 
us from finding important effects in periods during which corporate networks declined.
Fentener van Vlissingen junior9 scores high on market performance. He is often referred 
to as the most all-round founder of Dutch business. At a young age he already became one 
of the five board members of SHV, a non-listed family firm; the majority of the shares are 
in the hands of one family, the Fentener van Vlissingen family, which is also one of the 
richest families in the Netherlands. SHV was created in 1896 when eight coal merchants in 
Amsterdam decided to merge. One of them was Frederik Hendrik Fentener van Vlissingen, 
the grandfather of Fentener van Vlissingen junior. Grandfather Fentener van Vlissingen 
(1882–1962) was an entrepreneur and was married to Sophie Schout Velthuys (1882–1976), 
who came from a wealthy merchant banking family (Bank Vlaer & Kol, which later became 
part of AMRO Bank). In 1911 he became director of the family business. Also he was one of 
the creators of Hollandsche Kunstzijde-Industrie (a predecessor of AKZO). He collected 
capital to finance the start-up of the Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschappij (KLM) in 1919. 
From 1918 till 1933 Fentener van Vlissingen was among the advisors of the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs. Having taken part in trade negotiations for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
during the 1920s, he quickly gained a reputation as an economic expert and talented 
diplomat. Den Tex (2013) describes grandfather Fentener van Vlissingen as highly analytical 
and pragmatic.
Fentener van Vlissingen junior got his degree in Chemistry at Technische Hogeschool 
Delft in 1964. He saw opportunities in the chemical sector, because there were not so many 
engineers at that time. At the age of 32, he started working for the family firm SHV. Already 
after two years, in 1967, he became member of the managing board, of which he became 
chair in 1975. In an interview in 1972 in De Tijd he stated: ‘it is important in a family firm that 
board members have first worked in different firms or sectors’, which indicates that his man-
agement position was based on merit. He felt a responsibility for the 27,000 employees of 
SHV and towards his own share ownership or family capital. After retirement in 1984, Fentener 
van Vlissingen became a gladly seen supervisory director in Dutch business, such as at AKZO 
Nobel, ABN Amro, CSM, Pon Holdings and Gist-Brocades. Also he became advisor to the 
managing board of Unilever.
Fentener van Vlissingen has high social capital, being a big linker connected to other 
important directors and firms, among them multinationals, from an elite family and being 
a prominent business owner. Coming from a large merchant family Fentener van Vlissingen 
junior quickly increased his influence throughout the Netherlands. Driven by ambition and 
his entrepreneurial spirit he always recognised good business opportunities, with his social 
status he was able to maximise on these opportunities. We find that he significantly con-
tributed to market performance of the companies in his portfolio. Overall, we classify 
Fentener van Vlissingen junior as a highly skilled big linker with no particular management 
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style, as he is much more driven by case by case opportunities with his broad experience 
and coming from a family of reputable merchants.
The other big linker that has many board positions and contributes to firm strategies and 
performance is Van Tienhoven.10 He scores particularly high on leverage, which we explain 
by his background in banking. He was born in Amsterdam and his father was a director at 
the De Nederlandsche Bank (which later became the Dutch Central Bank). After finishing 
Gymnasium in Amsterdam he studied law and wrote in 1904 a PhD dissertation on the Paris 
stock exchange at Utrecht University. In 1905 he became director of a small bank in Utrecht 
and continued his career in 1910 at Rotterdamsche Bank, one of the largest banks in the 
Netherlands at that time. Whereas often directors held positions in firms in the same city at 
that time, Van Tienhoven held board positions at firms in various cities such as Amsterdam, 
Utrecht, Rotterdam, and The Hague. Although he was not from an elite family, he married 
into the elites by marrying a baroness. Also he was active in cultural life as director of 
Hollandsche Maatschappij van Wetenschappen, chairman of the Wagnervereniging, and 
member of the board of the cultural charity Holland Festival. He resigned in 1924 from the 
Rotterdamsche Bank, but became chairman of the supervisory board of Hollandsche Bank 
voor Zuid-Amerika. Clearly Van Tienhoven had a strong background in banking. This can 
explain both the strong effect in general as well as the specific effect on leverage. Typically, 
bankers were placed in the boards of borrowers in order to monitor the firms; the positive 
effect of leverage is evidence that Van Tienhoven was active in highly levered firms, most 
likely to oversee bank interests. But there are more bankers among these 10 big linkers, to 
whom we will turn now.
7.4. Bankers
Our set of 10 exceptional big linkers include four bankers; two before the Second World War 
(Taudin Chabot and Van Tienhoven) and two afterwards (Wakkie and Tieleman), which 
implies that bankers play an important role in shaping corporate strategies during the whole 
twentieth century. Apart from Van Tienhoven also Wakkie scores high on leverage.
Wakkie is from a family well established in Rotterdam; they lived and worked in this city 
over various generations.11 Both his father and grandfather were security brokers, and 
Wakkie himself made career at Rotterdamsche Bank where among other things he became 
head of the credit department. After he finished Gymnasium, he obtained a degree in law 
at Utrecht University and then returned to Rotterdam to make a career at Rotterdamsche 
Bank. Because of his roots, he felt committed to the city and had many additional positions 
in the boards of cultural and health institutions (e.g. the Harbor Hospital). After graduation 
in 1935 he started working as a volunteer at Rotterdamsche bank, where he became a 
director in 1944 at the Coolsingel office. In 1946 he was promoted to secretary of the board 
and in 1959 became a member of the board itself. After the merger with Amsterdamsche 
Bank in 1964 he became member of the board of the newly-formed AMRO bank.
Wakkie was head of the credit department in Rotterdam and was known for keeping 
people at a distance. Interesting, and an example of his influence on leverage of firms, is the 
case of the firm Rademakers, where he was member of the supervisory board in 1973–1983 
(in our sample). In 1983, when he is chairman of the supervisory board, the firm got a loan 
of 2.5 million guilders from the Dutch government, under the condition that they would 
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restructure the firm. It also implied that the banks would increase their loans by 1.2 million 
guilders and another loan of 1.4 million guilders of the Nederlandse Investerings Bank (NIB) 
would become effective. Most likely Wakkie as chairman of the supervisory board, with his 
expertise and established relations in banking, had helped this defaulted firm Rademakers 
(Het Vrije Volk, 8 January 1983), and this may explain the high leverage in the firms where 
he is a board member.
Another interesting and relatively unknown banker is Taudin Chabot.12 We do not observe 
a high effect for leverage, but strong positive effects for investments, ROA and market value. 
We explain this by his high social capital and long-time experience in the banking sector 
combined with an educational background in trade and economics. Various generations of 
the Taudin Chabot family, a protestant merchant lineage, followed the motto: ‘Ich dien’ (I am 
serving), which reflects a law-abiding attitude and compliance. Doing business was seen as 
a religious task and family members were not supposed to be entrepreneurs for their own 
profits, but for a higher cause. Taudin Chabot was already the fifth generation in the family 
business. In 1908, at 24 years of age, he joined the merchant bank firm Chabot Brothers, 
founded by his grandfather in 1840 in Rotterdam. Only 1 year later he became partner.
Chabot Brothers was the successor of David Chabot & Sons, established in the eighteenth 
century, which had to close in 1836 due to a bank run. The brothers establishing its successor 
in 1840 succeeded to win back all previous clients (with the exception of only one). It is 
argued that the cautious and conservative conduct with which they were able to recover 
trust in Rotterdam would remain characteristic for the entrepreneurial and protestant spirit 
of the Chabot family for many generations. His two older brothers (13 and 16 years older) 
were not interested in a career at Chabot, leaving Marius predestined to have a career at his 
father’s firm. His school career was clearly adjusted to this purpose. After primary school he 
attended three years of HBS and Handelsschool in Rotterdam followed by five years at the 
Handelsschool in Amsterdam. After graduation in 1903 he became an intern at banks in 
Stuttgart, London and Hamburg, between 1904 and 1907. Here he studied the trade in bills 
of exchange in particular. A more specialised study in economics did not exist at that time 
in the Netherlands. When Marius became partner of Chabot in 1909, the firm had a weak 
position compared to other Rotterdam banking houses. This had to do with the closed family 
character of the firm, as it was very difficult for ambitious non-family members to be pro-
moted to the top. Although the continuity of the family involvement was secured, this led 
to inertia. Among others, Chabot had a paternalistic and thrifty staff policy: low salaries, long 
working hours, and no career development. Taudin Chabot tried to change the firm into a 
more dynamic bank. His influence becomes visible by the increasing trade in international 
bills of exchange and profits increased rapidly since 1910.
In 1921, when Chabot was taken over by Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij (NHM) in 
Amsterdam, Taudin Chabot was appointed agent in Amsterdam and in 1929 he became board 
member of NHM. This is the moment Chabot appears in our sample. Interestingly, when he 
returned to Amsterdam as banker he met many of his fellow students but now in high board 
positions at various firms. He is described by W.F. Dutilh, someone who knew him personally, 
as a person with an eye for details and known for being very conscientious, and an infallible 
memory for numbers and names, combined with the required curiosity (Economisch-Historisch 
Jaarboek Volume 31). He knew very well how to make a firm more profitable. This is consistent 
with the strong effects we measure for return on assets, market value and investments.
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7.5. Management experience and specialised expertise
Although many of the big linkers have the majority of their positions in supervisory boards, 
the positions and experience in executive management roles allow them with a larger poten-
tial impact. Moreover, specialisation in specific industries may allow for a larger contribution 
to firms. Below we discuss three individuals with relevant managerial experience and specific 
expertise.
Koning scores high on ROA as well as on market value.13 At age 16, he started at the 
training institute for the navy, Koninklijke Instituut der Marine, in Den Helder in 1889. In 1905 
at his own request he got an honorary discharge to join the Koninklijke Paketvaart 
Maatschappij (KPM) in the largest Dutch colony (typically referred to as the Dutch East-
Indies), which is now Indonesia, as an inspector and quickly made career within the firm: in 
1912 board member and in 1916 chairman of the board. He was appointed in the Volksraad 
of the Dutch Indies around 1918. In 1919 he resigned to become board member of the 
Stoomvaart Maatschappij Nederland. He stayed as a member and between 1937 and 1948 
as chairman of the supervisory board of KPM. Koning had many board positions in firms 
related to shipping and the Dutch Indies, such as Nederlandsche Scheepvaart Unie, 
Droogdokmaatschappij Soerabaja, Nederlandsche Scheepsbouw-Maatschappij, Neder-
landsch Indische Steenkolen Handel-Maatschappij, Zeehaven en Kolenstation Sabang, and 
Werkspoor. We classify Koning as a big linker with specific expertise and knowledge of a 
sector. Because of his knowledge and expertise, instead of general management knowledge, 
he was able to contribute to return on assets and market value of these firms.
Even more interesting is Van Delden, who like Koning has specific management knowl-
edge of a particular sector.14 However in contrast to Koning, Van Delden has relatively few 
board positions (only 19 compared to 49 by Koning) and no management board positions. 
During his career he was supervisory director at four tram companies and two banks; all six 
firms were strongly directed towards the Dutch Indies: Semarang Joana Stoom-
trammaatschappij, Serajoedal Stoomtrammaatschappij, Oost Java Stoomtram Maatschappij, 
semarang Cheribon Stoomtrammaatschappij, Nederlandsch Indische Escompto 
Maatschappij, the Nederlandsch Indische Handelsbank. In the Dutch East Indies the four 
tram rail companies were independent companies. However, in the Netherlands there was 
one joint management. Also the firms were managed in the same way, the four firms had 
one joint general agent in the Dutch East Indies, and the personnel could be transferred 
from one company to another. We argue that Van Delden’s high score on investments – after 
controlling for industry effects – is driven by the relatively high investments in rails and trams 
in the firms in his portfolio, which increases fixed assets. The high effect on dividends is 
probably caused by the homogeneity of his portfolio and a life cycle effect, as many transport 
companies were benefitting from the investments and able to pay relatively high dividends.
In contrast, Hoboken van Cortgene scores in particular low on investments and high on 
leverage.15 This means that he favours an investment strategy of using debt, whereas the 
amount of fixed assets grows relatively slowly when he is sitting on the board. He makes the 
highest contribution to Dutch businesses in general but has only 15 board positions, which 
is the lowest number of the top-10 big linkers. Also his centrality with 13.7% is the lowest. 
Thus, comparable to Van Delden he has few board positions of which none are on a man-
agement board. Like Van Delden he was able to build up management expertise in a certain 
sector. However, his management style was much more risk seeking.
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Hoboken van Cortgene was partner in Hoboken & Co, a trading company and private 
bank, and in distiller Hoboken, De Bie & Co. He was head of Hoboken & Co for 58 years during 
which the firm got worldwide fame, and in particular had strong relations with the Dutch 
Indies. Hoboken & Co was created already in 1775 as a trading house. Hoboken van Cortgene 
was incorporated in the firm in 1863. With him being from the third generation, we can 
define Hoboken & Co a true family firm. From the end of the nineteenth century the firm 
started to pursue banking activities as well. This might explain his preference for high lever-
age. More generally, one could explain his high overall contribution to the fact that he was 
well known and respected; in other words he had high social capital, that is connections to 
other persons and firms, owner of a family firm, and member of a trading and banking family. 
Hoboken van Cortgene was one of the richest persons of his time. He was societally heavily 
engaged being board member of for example Prins Hendrik Museum, Rotterdam Theatre, 
and Diergaarde Zoo. He was also politically engaged as member of the regional and depart-
mental authorities (Provinciale Staten) of South Holland. At his funeral in 1922 the interest 
was overwhelming. The Mayor and a City Council Member, as well as many trade represen-
tatives, among them the chair of the Chamber of Commerce, the board of Diergaarde Zoo, 
the board of Rotterdam Theatre, and many members of the most important Rotterdam 
families were present.
8. Conclusion
Research on the effects of directors on firms’ strategies has a long tradition, both in manage-
ment and organisation studies, as well as in business history. In the business studies literature 
the investigation of characteristics of directors in larger samples or of entire boards is the 
mainstream approach. On the contrary, in business history, networks are described and indi-
vidual directors are studied in their historical context. These two streams of literature are rec-
onciled in this study. We argue that the investigation of large samples can be used to trace 
individuals with exceptional effects on firms’ strategies, in particular when fixed effect estima-
tions are applied. Then, we argue, the business historical approach can be applied on these 
exceptional individual directors in order to study the heterogeneity of motivations for director 
effects, aiming to draw causal inferences and make generalisations. In our view, this mixed-
method approach combines the strengths of statistical and historical analyses, i.e. quantifica-
tion of effects in large samples and a perspective on unique cases in their historical context.
We demonstrate that being a big linker as such is not what yields an effect, but being a big 
linker with particular characteristics. This implies that board interlock studies that just look at 
directors that are big linker or not are incomplete. In other words, we find that the presence 
of big linkers on the board of Dutch corporations are not necessarily in and of itself valuable 
for corporate decisions. Rather we find that individual big linkers show systematic correlations 
with various corporate decisions and policy variables. That is, understanding the role of big 
linkers and their networks depend on individual characteristic and big linkers cannot be treated 
as a homogeneous group. This is why our statistical approach identifies exceptional big linkers. 
Overall our contribution to the business history literature is that quantitative methods such 
as fixed effects models allow for the identification of exceptional individuals that have shaped 
businesses, affected corporate policies and have been left unstudied.
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We show that the directors with the highest systematic relevance for corporate strategies 
are not those who are most central in the Dutch network, nor are they the ones with the 
most connections. Rather we argue that they are well-connected and have substantial man-
agement experience or industry expertise. Their social capital is high, characterised by many 
connections with other firms as well as with cultural and political institutions. We show that 
the individuals with systematic relevance are not only descendants from nobility, rather they 
come from merchant and banking families. Also, we find that inherited capital built up by 
generations of families is important, and maybe even more important than capital built up 
by education. Additionally we find that throughout the twentieth century bankers have 
played an important role in shaping corporate strategies. In addition to these patterns we 
find many effects specific to firms and individual directors, which underlines the importance 
of our mixed-method approach. This line of research opens new avenues for research that 
combines historical or archival sources in combination with empirical analysis. Further 
research is needed to investigate the characteristics of exceptional big linkers.
Notes
 1. Our analysis shows that there are no female big linkers in de Dutch corporate network during 
the twentieth century. Please note the ten occurrences for at least three firms involve board 
presence in many firm-years. For example, a director is a big linker with presence in 1908, 1913, 
and 1918 in two firms and 1908, 1913, 1918, and 1923 in one more firm. Assuming that the 
presence is uninterrupted, the minimum number of firm-years is eleven in the two firms and 
sixteen in the other, i.e. 38 years in total.
 2. We explain the following firm strategies (i.e. outcome variables); return on equity, return on 
assets, dividends, leverage, interest coverage, investment, growth, liquid assets, net working 
capital, current ratio, tangibility, and market-to-book. In Models (1)–(3), Fi,t is a vector of firm 
specific variable different for every outcome variable. For return on equity and return on assets 
we use; liquid assets, leverage, firm size and tangibility. For dividends, we use liquid assets, 
leverage, firm size, tangibility, return on assets, retained profits, and a dummy variable for firms 
that report losses. For leverage and interest coverage we use; liquid assets, firm size, tangibility, 
return on assets and dividends. For investments and growth we use; liquid assets, leverage, 
firm size, tangibility, return on assets and dividends. For liquid assets we use; firm size, leverage, 
return on assets and dividends. For net working capital, current ratio, tangibility and market to 
book we use leverage, firm size, return on assets and dividends. All estimations contain a dum-
my for conservatism (i.e. rapid depreciation).
 3. The five periods are 1908–1923, 1928–1938, 1948–1963, 1968–1983, and 1988–2003.
 4. Models (1) through (3) are estimated using ordinary least squares with robust standard errors, 
clustered at the firm level.
 5. We make two important assumptions. Big linker effects are constant over all firm-year-posi-
tions and the effects are measured with other board members as benchmark. As a result, the 
estimations are sophisticated correlations that are constant for directors over all seats they 
occupy. Thus, an effect might be called a ‘style’ a director has (see also Bertrand & Schoar, 2003). 
Also important to bear in mind is that our estimates are correlations because all inputs are 
measured contemporaneously. The correlation could be driven by selection (matching direc-
tors with the goals of a firm) or by influence (directors indeed influence outcomes) (for a dis-
cussion, see Cronqvist & Fahlenbrach, 2009). For future research we propose out-of-sample 
tests for the robustness of the director fixed effects. We thank an anonymous reviewer for this 
suggestion. Unfortunately it is not feasible given our data.
 6. We thank an anonymous reviewer for these suggestions. The results are available upon re-
quest from the corresponding author. Please see footnote 9.
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 7. An exception is the market price of the shares (2888 observations) due to missing share price 
information. Two other, exceptions are investments (2636 observations) and growth (2725 
 observations, for which we require fixed assets and total assets, respectively 5 years earlier.
 8. As mentioned in footnote 7, we have conducted robustness analyses using LOOCV and LASSO 
estimations. The LOOCV show that our models preform reasonably well when we estimate 
Equation (3) for N − 1 companies N times. We find that the explanatory power across all our 
models is on average 22%. This number increases when we exclude our investments equa-
tion. Due to the limited sample size for this variable and hence the low explanatory power of 
the equation, the out-of-sample predictive power is also rather low. This is also the reason why 
we exclude our investment equation from the LASSO estimation. We conclude that all our 
models are valid. However, the results for the investment equation need to be interpreted 
with caution. Secondly, the LASSO estimations show that our models are of decent quality. We 
find that explained variance of our model is always close to the explained variance reported 
in Table 5C.
 9. For Fentener van Vlissingen we used the following sources: Atlas van de Macht 1998; Nieuwsblad 
van het Noorden 16-10-1964; an interview in De Tijd 26-02-1972; NRC Handelsblad 30-09-1975; 
NRC Handelsblad 27-03-2006; Charles den Tex, Ik ben koopman. Kroniek van de familie Fentener 
van Vlissingen (De Geus 2013).
 10. For Van Tienhoven we used the following sources: Persoonlijkheden in het Koninkrijk der 
Nederlanden, see http://www.iisg.nl/ondernemers/pdf/pers-1469-01.pdf; De Telegraaf 10-06-
1924; Algemeen Handelsblad 26-03-1936; Algemeen Handelsblad 27-11-1950.
 11. For Wakkie we used the following sources: P.E.E. Kleyn van Willigen, ‘Mr. H.N. Wakkie, 1911–
1989’, in: Rotterdams Jaarboekje 1990: 161–164; NRC Handelsblad 29-07-1977; Het Vrije Volk 11-
01-1980; Het Vrije Volk 08-01-1983; De Telegraaf 11-04-1989; NRC Handelsblad 10-04-1989; NRC 
Handelsblad 12-04-1989.
 12. For Taudin Chabot we used the following sources: Persoonlijkheden in het Koninkrijk der 
Nederlanden; C. Helderman, ‘Marius Taudin Chabot 1884–1966’, in: J. Visser et al., Nederlandse 
Ondernemers. Rotterdam 1850-1950 (Zutphen 2014): 68-73; W.F. Dutilh, ‘M. Taudin Chabot’, in: 
Economisch-historisch jaarboek Volume 31: 205–208; NEHA, http://www.iisg.nl/ondernemers/
pdf/ehjb31-taudin.pdf.
 13. For Koning we used the following sources: Persoonlijkheden in het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden; 
De Sumatra Post 19-06-1908; Het nieuws van den dag voor Nederlandsch-Indië 10-07-1909; De 
Sumatra post 19-11-1915; Bataviaasch Nieuwsblad 03-05-1916; Het nieuws van de dag voor 
Nederlandsch-Indië 15-04-1919; Het Nieuws van den dag voor Nederlandsch-Indië 17-05-1926; 
De Indische Courant 16-05-1930; Nieuwsblad van het Noorden 14-06-1963; Uitlaat, Magazine 
KPM 01-02-1950.
 14. For Van Delden we used the following sources: Het Nieuws van de dag voor Nederlandsch-Indië 
09-01-1902; Het nieuws van den dag: kleine courant 16-06-1903.
 15. For Hoboken van Cortgene we used the following sources: Visser et al. (eds.), Rotterdamse on-
dernemers 1850-1950 (Rotterdam 2002): 102–108; A. Hoynck van Papendrecht, Gedenkboek A. 
van Hoboken & Co, 1774-1924 (NA, 1924); Rotterdamsch Nieuwsblad 06-02-1907; Algemeen 
Handelsblad 25-06-1907; Algemeen Handelsblad 01-01-1913; De Tijd 07-02-1922; Rotterdamsch 
Nieuwsblad, 08-02-1922.
Acknowledgements
We thank the editor Stephanie Decker, two anonymous reviewers, Joost Jonker, Oscar Gelderblom, 
Chris Colvin, John Turner and workshop and seminar participants at European Group for Organizational 
Studies (Rotterdam, 2014), Queen’s University Belfast, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Radboud 
University Nijmegen, and King’s College for helpful comments. The data that supports the findings 
of this study are available from the corresponding author, Gerarda Westerhuis, upon reasonable 
request.
28 A. DE JONG ET AL.
Funding
This data was collected as part of the NWO project ‘The corporate governance of Dutch 
business in the 20th century – structural change and performance’ (NWO 360-52-080).
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
Notes on contributor
Abe de Jong is a professor of finance at Monash University and Rotterdam School of Manage-
ment, Erasmus University. His research interests are in empirical corporate finance and business 
and financial history.
Philip T. Fliers is a research fellow at Queen’s University Belfast and a research associate at Queen’s 
Centre for Economic History. His research interest are in empirical corporate finance, governance 
and financial history. 
Gerarda Westerhuis is an assistant professor at Utrecht University. Her research interests are in 
business history, in particular in corporate governance, elites and financing.
ORCID
Abe de Jong  http://orcid.org/0000-0002-2809-5465
Philip T. Fliers  http://orcid.org/0000-0003-2197-8131
References
Abowd, J. M., Kramarz, F., & Margolis, D. N. (1999). High wage workers and high wage firms. 
Econometrica, 67(2), 251–333. doi:10.1111/1468-0262.00020
Andres, C., Bongard, I., & Lehmann, M. (2013). Is busy really busy? Board governance revisited. Journal 
of Business Finance & Accounting, 40(9–10), 1221–1246. doi:10.1111/jbfa.12051
Bainbridge, S. M. (1993). In defense of the shareholder wealth maximization norm: A reply to Professor 
Green. Washington and Lee Law Review, 50, 1423.
Bamber, L. S., Jiang, J., & Wang, I. y. (2010). What’s my style? The influence of top managers on volun-
tary corporate financial disclosure. The Accounting Review, 85(4), 1131–1162. doi:10.2308/
accr.2010.85.4.1131
Bertrand, M., & Schoar, A. (2003). Managing with style: The effect of managers on firm policies. The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(4), 1169–1208. doi:10.1162/003355303322552775
Bouwman, C. H. (2011). Corporate governance propagation through overlapping directors. Review of 
Financial Studies, 24(7), 2358–2394. doi:10.1093/rfs/hhr034
Carpenter, M. A., Li, M., & Jiang, H. (2012). Social network research in organizational contexts: A sys-
tematic review of methodological issues and choices. Journal of Management, 38(4), 1328–1361. 
doi:10.1177/0149206312440119
Carpenter, M. A., & Westphal, J. D. (2001). The strategic context of external network ties: Examining the 
impact of director appointments on board involvement in strategic decision making. Academy of 
Management Journal, 44(4), 639–660. doi:10.2307/3069408
BUSINESS HISTORy 29
Colvin, C. L., De Jong, A., & Fliers, P. T. (2015). Predicting the past: Understanding the causes of bank 
distress in the Netherlands in the 1920s. Explorations in Economic History, 55, 97–121. doi:10.1016/j.
eeh.2014.09.001
Cronqvist, H., & Fahlenbrach, R. (2008). Large shareholders and corporate policies. Review of Financial 
Studies, 22(10), 3941–3976. doi:10.1093/rfs/hhn093
David, T., & Westerhuis, G. (2014). The power of corporate networks: A comparative and historical per-
spective. London: Routledge.
Davis, G. F. (1991). Agents without principles? The spread of the poison pill through the intercorporate 
network. Administrative Science Quarterly, 36(4), 583–613. doi:10.2307/2393275
DeJong, D., & Ling, Z. (2013). Managers: Their effects on accruals and firm policies. Journal of Business 
Finance & Accounting, 40(1–2), 82–114. doi:10.1111/jbfa.12012
De Jong, A., Kabir, R., Marra, T., & Röell, A. (2001). Ownership and control in the Netherlands. In F. Barca 
& M. Becht (Eds.), The control of corporate Europe (pp. 188–206). New york: Oxford University Press.
De Jong, A., Röell, A., & Westerhuis, G. (2014). The evolving role of shareholders in Dutch corporate 
governance. In K. E. Sluyterman (Eds.), Varieties of capitalism and business history: The Dutch case 
(pp. 28–50). New york: Routledge.
DiMaggio, P., & Powell, W. W. (1983). The iron cage revisited: Collective rationality and institutional 
isomorphism in organizational fields. American Sociological Review, 48(2), 147–160. doi:10.2307/ 
2095101
Fama, E. F. (1980). Agency problems and the theory of the firm. Journal of Political Economy, 88(2), 
288–307. doi:10.1086/260866
Ferris, S. P., Jagannathan, M., & Pritchard, A. C. (2003). Too busy to mind the business? Monitoring by 
directors with multiple board appointments. The Journal of Finance, 58(3), 1087–1111. doi:10.1111/ 
1540-6261.00559
Fich, E. M., & Shivdasani, A. (2006). Are busy boards effective monitors? The Journal of Finance, 61(2), 
689–724. doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2006.00852.x
Ge, W., Matsumoto, D., & Zhang, J. L. (2011). Do CFOs have style? An empirical investigation of the ef-
fect of individual CFOs on accounting practices. Contemporary Accounting Research, 28(4), 1141–
1179. doi:10.1111/j.1911-3846.2011.01097.x
Geisser, S. (1975). The predictive sample reuse method with applications. Journal of the American 
Statistical Association, 70(350), 320–328. doi:10.2307/2285815
Graham, J. R., Li, S., & Qiu, J. (2012). Managerial attributes and executive compensation. Review of 
Financial Studies, 25(1), 144–186. doi:10.1093/rfs/hhr076
Green, S. B. (1991). How many subjects does it take to do a regression analysis? Multivariate Behavioral 
Research, 26(3), 499–510. doi:10.1207/s15327906mbr2603_7
Hall, P. A., & Soskice, D. (2003). Varieties of capitalism and institutional change: A response to three 
critics. Comparative European Politics, 1(2), 241–250. doi:10.1057/palgrave.cep.6110010
Harris, I. C., & Shimizu, K. (2004). Too busy to serve? An examination of the influence of overboarded 
directors. Journal of Management Studies, 41(5), 775–798. doi:10.1111/j.1467-6486.2004.00453.x
Haunschild, P. R. (1993). Interorganizational imitation: The impact of interlocks on corporate acquisi-
tion activity. Administrative Science Quarterly, 38(4), 564–592. doi:10.2307/2393337
Heemskerk, E., & Fennema, M. (2009). Network dynamics of the Dutch business elite. International 
Sociology , 24(6), 807–832. doi:10.1177/0268580909343496
Helmers, M. H., Mokken, R. J., Plijter, R. C., & Stokman, F. N. (1975). Graven naar Macht: Op Zoek naar de 
Kern van de Nederlandse Economie. Amsterdam: Van Gennep.
Hermalin, B. E., & Weisbach, M. S. (2003). Boards of directors as an endogenously determined institu-
tion: A survey of the economic literature. FBRNY Economic Policy Review, 9(1), 7–26.
Johnson, J. L., Daily, C. M., & Ellstrand, A. E. (1996). Boards of directors: A review and research 
agenda. Journal of Management, 22(3), 409–438. doi:10.1177/014920639602200303
Johnson, R. B., & Onwuegbuzie, A. J. (2004). Mixed methods research: A research paradigm whose 
time has come. Educational Researcher, 33(7), 14–26. doi:10.3102/0013189X033007014
Kesner, I. F., & Johnson, R. B. (1990). An investigation of the relationship between board composition 
and stockholder suits. Strategic Management Journal, 11(4), 327–336. doi:10.1002/smj.4250110408
30 A. DE JONG ET AL.
Khanna, T., & Rivkin, J. W. (2006). Interorganizational ties and business groups boundaries: Evidence 
from an emerging economy. Organization Science, 17(3), 333–352. doi:10.1287/orsc.1060.0188
Lamoreaux, N. R. (1991). ‘No arbitrary discretion’: Specialisation in short-term commercial lending by 
banks in late nineteenth-century New England. Business History, 33(3), 93–118. doi:10.1080/ 
00076799100000103
Lluch, A., Rinaldi, A., Salvaj, E., & Vasta, M. (2017). Directors and syndics in corporate networks: 
Argentina and Italy compared (1913-1990). Business History, 61, 603–628. doi:10.1080/00076791.2
017.1382474
Lorsch, J., & MacIver, E. (1989). The reality of America’s corporate boards. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
Business School Press.
Martin, G., Gozubuyuk, R., & Becerra, M. (2015). Interlocks and firm performance: The role of uncer-
tainty in the directorate interlock performance relationship. Strategic Management Journal, 36(2), 
235–253. doi:10.1002/smj.2216
Mizruchi, M. (1996). What do interlocks do? An analysis, critique, and assessment of research on inter-
locking directorates. Annual Review of Sociology, 22(1), 271–298. doi:10.1146/annurev.soc.22.1.271
Morck, R., & yeung, B. (2011). Economics, history, and causation. Business History Review, 85(1), 39–63. 
doi:10.1017/S000768051100002X
Musacchio, A., & Read, I. (2007). Bankers, industrialists, and their cliques: Elite networks in Mexico and 
Brazil during early industrialization. Enterprise and Society, 8(4), 842–880. doi:10.1093/es/khm079
Pfeffer, J. (1972). Size and composition of corporate boards of directors: The organization and its en-
vironment. Administrative Science Quarterly, 17(2), 218–228. doi:10.2307/2393956
Pennings, J. M. (1980). Interlocking directorates. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Inc Pub.
Rajan, R. G., & Zingales, L. G. (2003). Saving capitalism from the capitalists: Unleashing the power of fi-
nancial markets to create wealth and spread opportunity. New york: Chicago Booth Papers.
Richardson, S. A., Tuna, A., & Wysocki, P. D. (2003). Accounting for taste: Board member preferences 
and corporate policy choices. MIT Sloan Working Paper No. 4307-03. Retrieved from https://ssrn.
com/abstract=405101 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.405101
Schouten, N., Glastra van Loon, K., Kox, T., &  de Ridder, P. (1998). Atlas van de Macht. Rotterdam: Ketch-
Up Press.
Shane, S., & Cable, D. (2002). Network ties, reputation, and the financing of new ventures. Management 
Science, 48(3), 364–381. doi:10.1287/mnsc.48.3.364.7731
Sluyterman, K. E. (2005). Dutch enterprise in the twentieth century: Business strategies in a small open 
economy. London: Routledge.
Sluyterman, K. E. (2014). Varieties of capitalism and business history: The Dutch case. London: Routledge.
Small, M. L. (2011). How to conduct a mixed methods study: Recent trends in a rapidly growing liter-
ature. Annual Review of Sociology, 37(1), 57. doi:10.1146/annurev.soc.012809.102657
Streeck, W. (2001). Introduction: Explorations into the origins of nonliberal capitalism in Germany and 
Japan. In The origins of nonliberal capitalism: Germany and Japan in comparison (pp. 1–38). New 
york: Cornell University Press.
Tashakkori, A., & Teddlie, C. (2003). Handbook of Mixed Methods in Social and Behavorial Research. 
Thousand Oaks: Sage. 
Tashakkori, A., & Teddlie, C. (2010). Sage handbook of mixed methods in social & behavioral research. New 
york:  Sage.
Tibshirani, R. (1996). Regression shrinkage and selection via the lasso. Journal of the Royal Statistical 
Society: Series B (Methodological), 58(1), 267–288. doi:10.1111/j.2517-6161.1996.tb02080.x
Useem, M. (1979). The social organization of the American business elite and participation of corpo-
ration directors in the governance of American institutions. American Sociological Review, 44(4), 
553–572. doi:10.2307/2094587
Uzzi, B. (1996). The sources and consequences of embeddedness for the economic performance of 
organizations: The network effect. American Sociological Review, 61(4), 674. doi:10.2307/2096399
Westerhuis, G. (2014). The Dutch corporate network: Considering its persistence. In T. David & G. 
Westerhuis (Eds.), The power of corporate networks: A comparative and historical perspective. 
(pp. 107–124).  Routledge.
BUSINESS HISTORy 31
Westerhuis, G., & De Jong, A. (2015). Over Geld en Macht: Financiering en corporate governance van het 
Nederlandse Bedrijfsleven. Amsterdam: Boom.
Westphal, J. D. (1999). Collaboration in the boardroom: Behavioral and performance consequences of 
CEO-board social ties. Academy of Management Journal, 42(1), 7–24. doi:10.2307/256871
Wilson, J. F., Buchnea, E., & Tilba, A. (2017). The British corporate network, 1904-1976: Revisiting the 
finance-industry relationship. Business History, 60, 779–806. doi:10.1080/00076791.2017.1333106
Windolf, P. (1998). Elite networks in Germany and Britain. Sociology, 32(2), 321–351. doi:10.1177/ 
0038038598032002006
List of references for prosopography
Books
den Tex, C. (2013). Ik ben een koopman. Kroniek van de familie Fentener van Vlissingen. De Geus.
Dutilh, W. F., & Taudin Chabot, M. Economisch-Historisch Jaarboek (Vol. 31, pp. 205–208).
Helderman, C. (2014). Marius Taudin Chabot 1884-1966. In J. Visser (Ed.), Nederlandse Ondernemers. 
Rotterdam 1850-1950 (pp. 68–73). Zutphen.
Hoynck van Papendrecht, A. Gedenkboek A. van Hoboken & Co, 1774-1924.
Kleyn van Willigen, P. (1990). Mr. H.N. Wakkie, 1911-1989. Rotterdams Jaarboekje 1990 (pp. 161–164).
Uitlaat, Magazine KPM.
Visser J. et al. eds. (2002). Rotterdamse ondernemers 1850-1950. Rotterdam.
Newspapers, consulted via delpher
Bataviaasch Nieuwsblad
Nieuwsblad van het Noorden
De Indische Courant
Het Nieuws van den Dag voor Nederlandsch-Indië
Het Nieuws van den Dag: Kleine Courant
Rotterdamsch Nieuwsblad
De Sumatra Post
De Tijd
NRC Handelsblad
De Telegraaf
Algemeen Handelsblad
Het Vrije Volk
